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Article 4

Surrogacy: An Illinois Policy Conceived
Daniel Rosman*
It is predictable that the precipitous decline in the number of available
children for adoption will find many Illinois couples pursuing the
surrogate route, as has happened in other states. The current uncertain
status of Illinois law regarding surrogate contracts demands legislative
focus and direction. To prevent protracted litigation as in other
in the
jurisdictions and to prevent injustices to those involved
1
surrogate arrangement, "what we do, let us do quickly."

I.

INTRODUCTION

Still relevant today, the above quote speaks to the continued lack of
certainty facing many of those interested in surrogacy. Although the
modem surrogacy technique has existed for several years, 2 and is
increasing in popularity, 3 a comprehensive statewide approach has not
yet emerged in Illinois.
Like many other state legislatures, the Illinois General Assembly has
yet to promulgate a comprehensive policy concerning this complex and

Assistant General Counsel, Illinois Department of Human Services; B.S. University of Illinois, 1987; J.D. DePaul University, 1991. Mr. Rosman concentrates in labor and employment
matters. Previously, Mr. Rosman worked as a Staff Attorney with the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
in Lake County and the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in Kane County. Mr. Rosman has previously
contributed to the Illinois Judicial Symposium Issue. Mr. Rosman wishes to acknowledge the
support and direction of Judge Barbara Gilleran Johnson in preparing this Article.
1. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Surrogate Parenthood: A Need for Legislative Direction,71 ILL. B.J.
412, 417 (1983).
2. See P.C. Steptoe & R.G. Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a Human Embryo,
LANCET, Aug. 12, 1978, at 366, 366 (discussing the successful birth of a child conceived through
in vitro fertilization in 1978).
3. As of January 1993, an estimated 5,500 babies have been born in the United States through
surrogate parenting since 1979. See Steve Johnson & V. Dion Hayes, Surrogacy Debated, but
Still the Answer for Some, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1993, § 2 (Northwest) at 1. See generally ROBERT
LEE HOTZ, DESIGNS ON LIFE (1991). Hotz asserts that "[b]y 1990 there were thousands of people
whose conception took place outside the human body. And by the year 2010, such children are
expected to number a million or more." Id. at 3.
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controversial issue. 4 Although new legislation does give courts
direction on gestational surrogate matters, it fails to address other
important surrogate disputes. For instance, the Illinois General
Assembly recently enacted Public Act 91-3085 ("P.A. 91-308"), which
defines the rights of the parties in certain instances of gestational
surrogacy. 6 Although P.A. 91-308 pieces together the perimeter of this
jigsaw puzzle, questions still remain in regard to both traditional
surrogate arrangements 7 and arrangements where the fetus is created
using the egg and/or sperm of an anonymous donor. As a result, these
unanswered questions must be resolved indirectly via a patchwork of
associated laws and common law doctrines.
Illinois, however, has come further than other states. Most states
have either avoided the issue, banned the practice outright, or
intentionally left the issue and controversy to the courts.
Notwithstanding Baby Louise Brown's grand debut more than twenty
years ago, 8 neither the legislature nor the courts have reached a
nationwide consensus.
In most jurisdictions, the law remains a two-dimensional sentry
fumbling to contain a three-dimensional problem.
Where the
legislatures fail to provide guidance, courts struggle to impose a
consistent, logical and just framework to resolve surrogate disputes.
The lack of legislative direction causes many tribunals to awkwardly
analogize to conventional yet inadequate jurisprudence. 9 Assuming that
4. The following states have no surrogacy statute in effect: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
5. Act of July 29, 1999, Pub. Act. No. 91-308, sec. 6, § 45/6, 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2891, 91-2
(West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/6).
6. See id. (discussing requirements to establish a parent-child relationship). Gestational surrogacy occurs when the surrogate does not supply the sperm or egg, but only the use of the womb.
See id.
7. A traditional arrangement is where the surrogate supplies the egg and womb and is inseminated with the sperm of the intended father.
8. See Steptoe & Edwards, supra note 2, at 366 (discussing Louise Brown's birth as the first
child successfully conceived by in vitro fertilization).
9. One example of such an attempt recently occurred in California regarding the parentage and
support of Jaycee Buzzanca. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998). In this matter, five individuals contributed to Jaycee's birth, including: an anonymous
sperm donor, an anonymous egg donor, the intended mother (Luanne Buzzanca), the intended
father (John Buzzanca) and the surrogate (Pamela Snell). See id. at 282. Shortly before Snell
gave birth, John filed for divorce. See id. at 282-83. In its decision, the Orange County Superior
Court stated that notwithstanding the existence of a surrogacy agreement between the intended
parents and the surrogate and her husband: (1) no court had ever established that John was the
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no statutory scheme directly applies, courts often look toward principles
of contract law, constitutional law, and family law. A contractual
analysis typically reviews the agreement between the surrogate and
intended parents, focusing on whether the agreement is enforceable or
against public policy. 10 A constitutional analysis frequently centers on
whether the parties' substantive due process rights may be abridged.
Fundamental rights under the Constitution include the right of privacy
and procreational autonomy." A constitutional analysis also focuses on
the equal protection issue of whether a suspect classification of
individuals has received equal treatment under the law. 12 Lastly, many
policymakers resolve surrogate predicaments by employing family law
concepts. 13 Typically, this analysis focuses on serving the "best
interests" of the child.
In the midst of the struggle, assisted conception technology is
maturing and becoming a relatively popular alternative to other
surrogacy techniques. 14 Recently developed methods in in vitro

father; (2) John had no support obligations; and (3) Luanne was not entitled to be declared the
legal mother because she must formally adopt Jaycee. See id. On appeal, the California Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the intended father is the legal father by virtue of
consenting to the procreation of the child through artificial insemination. See id. at 282. Also,
the court of appeals found that the intended mother was the legal mother because of her intent, as
well as under California's artificial insemination statute. See id. at 291.
10. See In re Petition for M.S.M. for Adoption of Infant, 19 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11171,
1563 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Sept. 20, 1993) (holding that a surrogate contractual
agreement violated the statutory provision against accepting compensation in exchange for the
surrender of a child); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fain. Ct. 1990); In re Adoption
of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. 1986) (upholding a surrogate contractual agreement).
For an academic analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995).
11. See Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that a decision to
bear children is protected by the right to privacy); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-99 (Tenn.
1992) (discussing the right to privacy and its constitutional underpinnings).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1; Soos v. Superior Court County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d
1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause a
statute that granted the surrogate mother the right to prove maternity but did not grant the same
right to the biological mother).
13. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1263-64 (N.J. 1988) (deciding that the right of procreation did not entitle the biological father and his wife to custody, but rather that the best interest of the child required such placement); see also Carl E. Schneider, Surrogacy Motherhood
from the Perspective of Family Law, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125 (1990) (discussing the
role of family law in surrogacy); Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate
Reasons and Surrogate Policies, 60 TENN. L. REV. 135 (1992) (discussing various surrogacy
policies); cf. Margaret Friedlander Birnig, A MaterialisticApproach to Surrogacy: Comment on
Richard Epstein's "Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement," 81 VA. L. REV.
2377 (1995) (objecting to surrogacy law based on a contractual theory and supporting the family
law application).
14. One source reports that the number of frozen embryos is estimated to be increasing by
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fertilization ("IVF")-including egg donation, embryo adoption, and
cryopreservation-give otherwise infertile men and woman significant
reproductive options. 15 Reports suggest that for every surrogate debacle
worthy of a made-for-TV movie, most arrangements reach completion
without incident. 16 In addition, the popularity and availability of these
IVF advancements are becoming more accessible and immediate given
the recent spawning of advocacy groups, informational groups and
organizational Internet web sites. 17
Reproductive advances are sure to become more accessible as states
mandate insurance coverage for infertility and as courts rule that
infertility is a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA"),' 8 which requires special accommodation. Currently, many

states require insurance companies to provide coverage for infertility
treatments. 19 Further, several courts have found that reproduction is a

10,000 a year. See Joan Beck, More Questions Than Answers in New Technology, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 20, 1997, § 1, at 27. Further, assisted conception has found its way into the "Hollywood"
mainstream. See Betsy Israel & Lorenzo Benet, Two Mons and a Baby, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Feb.
20, 1995, at 51 (discussing actress Deidre Hall's choice to use a surrogate parent to become a
mother); Dean Lamanna & Deidre Hall, What We Did for Love, LADIES HOME J., Dec. 1995, at
74 (describing Deidre Hall's life after deciding to become a mother with the help of a surrogate).
15. One attorney in the field states:
[d]evelopments in the field of egg donation have offered to over 100,000 women in the
United States, otherwise unable to produce healthy eggs due to premature ovarian failure, anatomically inaccessible ovaries, abnormal eggs, or lack of ovarian function due
to radiation, chemotherapy, or surgery, the opportunity to have a child who has a genetic relationship to her spouse.
Andrew W. Vorzimer & Lori A. Shafton, Egg Donation and the Law; Legal Issues to Consider
When Utilizing Egg Donation (last modified June 3, 1997) < http://surrogatelaw.org/ed.htm >; see
also Johnson & Hayes, supra note 3, at I (reporting that "[aidvancements in treatment mean that
about three-fourths or more of all infertility patients now wind up being able to have babies").
16. See Johnson & Hayes, supra note 3, at 1 (stating "Ralph Fagan, co-director of the Center
of Surrogate Parenting, in Beverly Hills, California contends that [as of early 1993] only 11 of
5,500 surrogacy arrangements have gone to litigation").
17. As of this writing, prominent web sites that pertain to surrogacy and infertility include: (1)
Resolve (visited Oct. 2, 1999) < http://www.resolve.org>; (2) The American Surrogacy Center,
Inc. (visited Oct. 2, 1999) <http://www.surrogacy.com>; and (3) The Organization of Parents
Through Surrogacy (visited Oct. 2, 1999) <http://www.OPTS.com>.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12207-13 (1994).
19. See American Society for Reproductive Medicine (visited Oct. 29, 1999)
<http://www.asrm.org/patient/insur.html> (citing state statutes that require insurance to be made
available for infertility treatments). These statutes include: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 2386-118 (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 431:10A-116.5,432:1-604 (Michie 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 74H, ch. 176A, § 8K,
ch. 176B, § 4J, ch. 176G, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-221521, 33-31-102 (1999); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221, 4303 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1742.39 (Anderson 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 2741-33 (1998); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.5105 (West 1981 & Supp. 1999).
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"major life activity" 20 and that infertility is a "disability" under the
ADA. 2 '
Conceptive technologies will continue to emerge, disputes will
inevitably present novel and perplexing questions. In many states,
including Illinois, disputes will arise where gaps in policy exist 22 and
their resolution will be unpredictable and often painful.
This Article will examine Illinois law pertinent to a surrogate
arrangement, first focusing on P.A. 91-308 and those issues left
unaddressed by this recent enactment. 23 This Article will then examine
those instances outside the scope of P.A. 91-308 and survey relevant
statutes in the event of a dispute or breach of an agreement. 24 Next, this
25
Article will discuss case law and legislation outside of Illinois.
26
Finally, this Article will propose legislative suggestions for Illinois.
II.

ILLINOIS OVERVIEW

A.

GestationalArrangement under P.A. 91-308
With recent additions to the Illinois Parentage Act of 198427
("Parentage Act") under P.A. 91-308, the Illinois legislature provides
28
aspiring parents the opportunity to bypass relevant adoption laws.
P.A. 91-308 allows this bypass to occur without any written agreement
between the parties. 29
Thus, this recent enactment effectively
overwrites the Parentage Act, which requires proof of birth to establish
30
maternity.

20. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-39 (1998) (holding that reproduction is
regarded as a major life activity, no less important than working or learning).
21. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(finding that a woman who is incapable of becoming pregnant through natural means is disabled).
22. See Judy Peres, Custody Tug of War Has Twist, Few Turns: Sperm Donor Fights For Parental Rights, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1997, § 1, at 1; Judy Peres, Sperm-Donor's Case Challenges
Old Laws, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1997, § 1, at 1 (discussing a Chicago case regarding parental
rights and artificial insemination).
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part ll.B.
25. See infra Parts III, IV.A.
26. See infra Parts III, IV.B.
27. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 45/1 to 27 (West 1998), amended by Act of July 29, 1999, Pub.
Act. No. 91-308, sec. 6, § 45/6, 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2891, 2891-92 (West) (to be codified at 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. §45/6).
28. For the statute governing the adoption process, see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 50/1 to 24
(West 1998).
29. See 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 45/4.
30. See id. The statute states in pertinent part: "[t]he parent and child relationship between a
child and (1) the natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the
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Under P.A. 91-308, the parties must satisfy six requirements prior to
the child's birth in order for intended parents to secure parentage
without going through the adoption process. 3 1 First, the gestational
surrogate must certify that she is not the biological mother of the child
and that she is carrying the child of the biological father (sperm donor)
and the biological mother (egg donor).32 Second, the surrogate's
husband must certify that he is not the biological father of the child and
that the child is that of the biological father (sperm donor) and the
biological mother (egg donor).33 Third, the biological mother must
certify that she donated the egg that formed the embryo carried by the
surrogate. 34 Fourth, the biological father must certify that he donated
the sperm that formed the embryo carried by the surrogate. 35 Fifth, a
licensed physician must certify that the above four requirements are
met. 36 Sixth, all certifications must be in writing and witnessed by two
competent adults. 37 Parentage is established upon completion of these
six conditions. A judicial or administrative proceeding to ratify
paternity upon completion of the above conditions is neither required
nor permitted.3 8
Unless otherwise determined by court order, if all of the above
requirements are not met before the child's birth, the child is presumed
to be the child of the surrogate and the surrogate's husband. 39 This
presumption, however, "may be rebutted by clear and convincing
' 4°
evidence.
Although this legislative addition provides direction for aspiring
parents, it fails to address all of the issues. For example, what is the
outcome where one of the intended parents is infertile and uses the
sperm or egg provided by an anonymous donor? Additionally, in
gestational arrangements, which surrogate expenses may the intended
parents cover? If the parties do enter into a written agreement, which
terms are enforceable? What recourse is available for the intended
child .....Id.
31. See Act of July 29, 1999, Pub. Act No. 91-308, sec. 6, § 45/6, 1999 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 2891,
2891-92 (West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6) (creating statutory provisions to
establish parent-child relationships when facing surrogacy issues).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. (providing the effect of meeting the statutory requirements).
40. Id.
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parents if all six conditions are not met before birth? Finally, how does
the state's policy affect traditional arrangements, if at all?
To the legislature's credit, P.A. 91-308 gives many hopeful parents
the opportunity to achieve their goal. Essentially, this approach relies
on the acknowledgements of the intended parents, the surrogate, and the
surrogate's husband. All that is required is the fulfillment of the six
conditions prior to the child's birth. Nonetheless, a percentage of
couples who are unable to conceive, and turn to either traditional
surrogacy or an anonymous donor, must still navigate the maze of
statutes that affect the surrogate process.
B. Arrangements Outside of P.A. 91-308
For a variety of reasons, aspiring parents may not be able to pursue
parentage under P.A. 91-308. For example, when an anonymous
donor's sperm or egg is used, the intended parents cannot represent that
he or she supplied the gamete. Likewise, when a traditional surrogate
arrangement is used, the intended mother cannot claim to have supplied
the egg.
In Illinois, these couples unable to secure parentage under P.A. 91308 cannot bypass the relevant adoption laws. Prior to the child's birth,
these couples cannot bind the surrogate through the use of
acknowledgements and consents. Instead, they must deftly negotiate an
41
assortment of unrelated statutes.
Often, these couples will memorialize their arrangement in an
agreement. Both the Illinois Criminal Code 42 and the Illinois Adoption
Act 43 restrict the creation of the agreement. Next, assuming that a
dispute arises after birth, parentage needs to be determined in
accordance with the Parentage Act. 44 Finally, if custody is at issue, the
dispute is to be resolved pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and
45
Dissolution of Marriage Act.
1. Creation of Surrogate Agreement
The Illinois Criminal Code contains a specific provision that places
parameters on the parties' contractual relationship. Entitled the
Adoption Compensation Prohibition Act 46 ("the Act"), this provision, as
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra notes 42-45 (identifying the statutory provisions that may apply).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§525/0.01 to 5 (West 1998).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 50/0.01 to 24.
Id. §§ 45/1 to 27.
Id. §§ 5/101 to 713.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 525/1 to 5.
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in most states, prohibits the receipt4 7 and payment of compensation for
the "placing out" of a child. 48 As used in the statute, "the term 'placing
out' means to arrange for the free care of a child in a family other than
that of the child's parent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle
or aunt or legal guardian, for the purpose of adoption or the purpose of
providing care." 49 With limited exception, the Act prohibits a woman
50
from receiving payment or compensation for her surrogate services.
The "placing out" definition exempts arrangements where placement
is to be made in the family of the child's parent, stepparent,
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt or legal guardian. This
suggests that arrangements involving the exempted parties are not
subject to criminal liability.
Notwithstanding the general prohibition against compensation, the
Act does allow for payment of certain expenses, if necessary. 5 1 Section
4.1 allows for payment of reasonable living expenses incurred by the
biological parents during the period of the biological mother's
pregnancy and for no more than thirty days after birth of the child. 52
These living expenses include reasonable costs for lodging, food, and
clothing.5 3 Expressly excluded, however, are "expenses for lost wages,
gifts, educational expenses, or other similar expenses." 54 In addition,
Illinois law allows adopting parents to pay the reasonable attorneys'
fees of the biological parents. 55 Payment may also be made for the
"reasonable and actual medical fees and hospital charges for services
56
rendered in connection with the birth."
Arrangements falling outside the framework of P.A. 91-308 must
also conform to Illinois' adoption laws. Often referred to as the

47.

See id. § 525/1.

48. See id. § 525/2.
49. Id. § 525/3.
50. See id. § 525/5. The first violation is a Class 4 felony, while any subsequent violation is
raised to a Class 3 felony. See id.
51. See id. § 525/4.1. Section 4.1(d) also states that in the event that the biological parents
decide not to place the child up for adoption, the adopting parent has no right to seek reimbursement for payments made to the biological parents. See id. § 525/4.1(d).
52. See id. § 525/4.1(a).
53. See id. Court approval must be obtained prior to payment of these expenses. See id. §
525/4.1(b).
54. Id. § 525/4.1(a).
55. See id.
56. Id. § 525/4. An arrangement, however, that does not clearly establish that such payment is
only for medical and hospital fees is against public policy. See In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540
N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989) (voiding an adoption agreement where a $10,000 payment to the natural mother could not be attributed to valid medical bills).
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"adoption default model,- 57 this approach must be followed where no
specific surrogate statute is in place. Furthermore, by default, parental
ties must be relinquished in accordance with actual adoption laws.
Typically, this involves the signing of consents by one or both legal
parents.
In a consensual arrangement, the birthing mother must wait at least
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child before giving a valid
consent.58 In contrast, the father may sign the consent prior to the birth
of the child; however, it only becomes irrevocable seventy-two hours
after the birth of the child.59 Once effective, the consents are generally
final and irrevocable, unless the adopting parents or their agents
obtained them through fraud or duress. 6° The biological parent has
twelve months from the date of execution to contest the validity of the
consent. 61 These rules would apply in instances involving traditional
surrogacy or an anonymous sperm or egg donor.
2. Parentage
For those instances not governed by P.A. 91-308, where the child is
born and the agreement is repudiated, an Illinois court must resort to
various statutes to determine each party's status. Initially and most
significantly, the court must resolve the parentage issue. 62 In resolving
63
this issue, courts often turn to the Parentage Act.
Under the Parentage Act, the mother-child relationship is typically
established by proof that the woman gave birth to the child. 64
Seemingly, this presumption is irrebutable and would allow the

57. See H. Joseph Gitlin, "Adoption Model" Does Not Apply To Surrogacy, Court Says, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., May 18, 1998, at 6 (stating the adoption model violates California public policy).

58. See 750 ILL. COMp. STAT.

§ 50/9 (West 1998).

59. See id.

60. See id. §50/11.
61. See id.
62. See Johnson & Hayes, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that as of 1993, only 11 out of 5,500 arrangements have gone to litigation). These agreements are most often repudiated when the surrogate decides that she does not want to relinquish parentage. It can also occur where the intended
parents reverse their desire to accept and adopt the child.
63. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT §§ 45/1 to 27 (West 1998). The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984
is not to be confused with the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT §§ 40/1 to 3 (West
1998) (concerning children born as a result of artificial insemination).

64. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4 (West 1998); see also People v. Morrison, 584 N.E.2d
509, 513 (I11.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1991) (holding that an unwed father must comply with statutory
procedures for establishing parentage, or subject himself to prosecution under the Illinois child
abduction statute). Maternity may also be established by proof of adoption. See 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 45/4.
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65
surrogate a superior claim to maternity over the intended mother.
Another section of the Parentage Act, however, suggests that maternity
may be determined in the same manner as paternity. 66 Specifically,
section 19 of the Parentage Act allows a woman who contributes her
genetic material as part of the embryo implanted in the surrogate to
establish maternity.67
Section 19 states that "[alny interested party may bring an action to
determine the existence or non-existence of a mother and child
relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act applicable
to the father and child relationship shall apply to the mother and child
relationship .... ,68 This section not only acknowledges that there may
be uncertainty in determining maternity, but it also intimates that
maternity may be established in the same manner as paternity, through
blood testing. 69 Therefore, depending on the interpretation, a surrogate
could possibly lose her claim to 70maternity when the intended mother has
contributed her genetic material.
Paternity may be established by several methods. First, it may be
established through an adversarial proceeding. 7 1 In the alternative,
where the intended father is also the biological father, paternity may be
established through the acknowledgment of all interested parties. 72 In
either an adversarial proceeding or a proceeding to establish paternity
by acknowledgment, where a man other than the intended father is

65. But see In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). In
Buzzanca, the California Court of Appeals, construing a similar statute, found the methods to establish parentage to be non-exhaustive. See id. at 284. Further, the court asserted that the fact
that a woman is the birth mother is irrelevant. See id. at 290-91. "Intended mother" refers to a
female, often unable to conceive or bear a child, that enters into an agreement to assume parentage to the child given birth by the surrogate.
66. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/11 (West 1998).
67. See id. §45/19.
68. Id.
69. See id. § 45/11.
70. A more in-depth explanation of this reasoning is found in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 780-82 (Cal. 1993). The Johnson court reviewed provisions similar to Illinois' Parentage
Act and found that maternity could be determined through blood testing. See id. at 781; see also
Soos v. Superior Court County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that a statute banning surrogacy violated the Equal Protection Clause in that men could rebut the
presumption of paternity, whereas woman who contribute genetic material could not).
71. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (West 1998) (establishing that actions may be brought
by the child, the mother, a person or public agency with custody of the child or who is providing
financial support, or another man alleging paternity).
72. See id. § 45/6 (signing and witnessing a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage will establish the parent-child relationship).
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presumed to be the biological father, 73 the presumed father must receive
notice in accordance with the statute.7 4
3.

Custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act

Like the parentage issue, certain custody issues also become
important issues in arrangements falling outside of P.A. 91-308. When
the intended father is also the biological father, paternity is properly
established. Specifically, the custody issue arises when the surrogate is
declared to be the legal mother and the surrogate agreement is
repudiated. In this situation, only the intended (biological) father, and
75
not the intended mother, has standing to make a claim.
As expected, if both legal parents assert a claim of custody, the "best
76
interests of the child" standard guides the court's determination.
Section 602 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
sets forth the fundamental considerations that are used to determine
"best interests." 77 Enumerated factors include: (1) the wishes of the
child's parent or parents; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the interaction
and interrelationship with parents and siblings or any other person; (4)
the child's adjustment to the home, school, or community; (5) the
mental and physical health of all people involved; (6) any physical
violence or threat of physical violence; (7) any domestic violence or
threat of domestic violence; and (8) the willingness and ability of each
parent to facilitate a close relationship between the other parent and the
child.78 Illinois courts also consider other factors such as race,79 the
work patterns of parents and their availability to children, 80 misconduct

73. Section 5 of the Parentage Act concerns the circumstances in which a man will be presumed to be the biological father. See id. § 45/5.
74. See id. § 45/9.1 (holding notice is required to be served on the presumed father by personal service or mail).
75. By statute, Illinois preserves the superior right of a natural parent by allowing a person
other than a parent standing to file a custody petition only where the child is not in the custody of
a parent. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/601 (West 1998).
76. Id. § 5/602.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d 212, 215 (I11.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979) (affirming the
trial court's consideration of race as a factor in determining custody where race was not decisive
of trial court's decision).
80. See In re Marriage of Leopando, 435 N.E.2d 1312, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982)
(determining that the father's lack of knowledge of the daily habits of the child coupled with a
work schedule that afforded minimum contact with the child justified awarding custody to the
mother), aff'd, 449 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. 1983); In re Marriage of Kush, 435 N.E.2d 921, 922-23 (I11.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1982) (noting the inability of mother to spend full time with the child is alone
insufficient to award custody to the father as a matter of law, but it is still a factor to be consid-
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of a parent, 8 1 cohabitation, 82 and substance abuse of a parent. 83 As of
this writing, Illinois courts have not assessed the impact of a surrogate
84
agreement on a custody decision.

III.

SURROGACY CASE LAW

As suggested earlier, P.A. 91-308 provides a mechanism for the
intended parents to bind the surrogate and secure parentage. 85 In

situations falling outside of P.A. 91-308, however, where court approval
is unavailable, the intended parents will often enter into an agreement
and rely on that agreement to secure parentage. 86 An agreement fixes
the expectations of the parties and accounts for future disputes. In the
event that a dispute arises that is not governed by statute, courts will

analyze the agreement using various common law doctrines. As in
other jurisdictions, an Illinois court encountering a surrogate dispute
would likely resort to principles of contract law, constitutional law, and
87
family law to make its decision.
A. ContractLaw
Arguments based in contract arise where the parties enter into a
surrogate agreement and the agreement is later repudiated. In these
situations, one side will attempt to enforce the agreement as written,
whereas the other side will argue that the agreement is invalid in view
of some public policy.

ered).
81. See Kauffman v. Kauffman, 333 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1975) (holding
that evidence of a drinking problem and adultery by mother during marriage does not conclusively establish mother as unfit).
82. See In re Marriage of Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ill. 1983) (rejecting premise that
custodial parent's cohabitation conclusively establishes custodial parent as unfit).
83. See Rizzo v. Rizzo, 420 N.E.2d 555, 559 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981) (determining that a
custodial parent's involvement with alcohol and drugs is relevant to the consideration of custody
when it affects the health of the custodial parent or her relationship with the child).
84. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this issue in its decision In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1255-61 (N.J. 1988). The New Jersey Supreme Court asserted that all circumstances,
including behavior of the parties during legal proceedings, should be considered to determine the
child's best interests. See id. at 1257-58. Further, the New Jersey court rejected the surrogate's
argument that custody should be denied to the intended parents to deter future surrogacy agreements. See id. at 1257.
85. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory requirements to establish parentage in a surrogate birth).
86. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (indicating that agreements are governed by
the Illinois Criminal Code and the Illinois Adoption Act).
87. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (outlining the various analyses a court
would use under contract law, constitutional law, and family law).
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Under Illinois adoption law, surrogate contracts are rendered
ineffective prior to the time that consents are signed and parentage is

relinquished. 88 Notwithstanding the status of the law, situations may
arise where the parties' surrogate contract is relevant. One such
instance is when the intended parents, after insemination and prior to
birth, no longer desire custody. In this situation, important concerns
arise, such as whether the agreement is enforceable and the extent to

which the agreement dictates the outcome. Another important inquiry is
whether the surrogate agreement controls in the event that Illinois'
adoption law is found to unconstitutionally infringe upon reproductive
rights. In these instances, it is instructive to review case law outside of

Illinois.
Typically, courts considering contract law in connection with a
surrogate dispute review public policy and the enforceability of the
agreement. In a traditional surrogate arrangement, a handful of courts
have found the agreement to be consistent with public policy in the
absence of a legislative pronouncement. 89 In these decisions, however,
the agreement is typically reviewed for "unfair advantage, undue
9
influence, or other overreaching." 0
The majority of courts, however, have invalidated these agreements
based on a number of policies. For instance, a California court recently
found a traditional surrogate agreement to be unenforceable for being in
derogation of relevant adoption law. 9 1 Similarly, in In re Adoption of
Paul,92 a New York Family Court voided a surrogate parenting
agreement that violated the statutory prohibition against compensation
for the surrender of a child. 93 The New York court noted that the
88. For the birth mother, Illinois adoption law invalidates consents signed earlier than 72
hours after birth. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/9 (West 1998). For the birth mother's husband, Illinois law allows a consent to be signed before birth; however, it is revocable up until 72
hours after birth. See id.
89. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sur. 1986) (approving surrogacy contract because it did not violate express statutory provisions). Since this opinion was
issued, the New York State Legislature has declared surrogacy contracts to be against public policy. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 122 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (stating "surrogate parenting contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and unenforceable"); see also In re Petition of M.S.M. for Adoption of Infant, 19 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No.
11171, 1563, 1564 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Sept. 20, 1993) (noting that when all parties consent, surrogate contract is valid unless legislative prohibition).
90. Petition of M.S.M., 19 Fam. L. Rep. at 1564 (stating that the court has the authority to review surrogacy contracts where there is evidence of a violation of established contract principles).
91. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to enforce a surrogacy contract at odds with adoption statute which requires consent).
92. In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
93. See id. at 818 (determining that agreement to pay $10,000 surrogate fee violates statutory
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participants have a constitutionally protected right to beget a child
through surrogacy. 94 The State, however, regulates the adoption
aspect. 95 The court indicated that the constitutional right to beget or
bear a child does not extend to compensating the surrogate for
relinquishing the child.9 6
In re Baby M, 97 a New Jersey case, provides another example of a
court finding an agreement for traditional surrogacy to be void in view
of public policy. 98 The case involved a surrogate who was artificially
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father. 99 In voiding the
surrogacy agreement, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the
contract conflicted with New Jersey laws concerning: (1) evaluation of
parental fitness in termination of parentage; 10 0 (2) revocability of
adoption in private 0 placement
adoptions; 1 1 and (3) compensation in
2
adoption situations.'
In addition, the Baby M court found the agreement violated a number
of public policies including: (1) the favoring of rearing by natural
parents; 10 3 (2) the favoring of equivalent treatment by the natural
parents (mother and father are to have equal access to the child); 10 4 (3)
the following of legislative procedures that govern consent to the
surrender of a child;10 5 (4) the "best interests" of the child as1 7 the
paramount determinant;l°06 and (5) the prohibition of "baby-selling.' 0
prohibition of payment for child bearing).
94. See id.
95. See id; see also Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. 1981) (noting that the state
has a valid interest in regulating surrogacy contracts because application of state adoption laws
gives legal custody).
96. See Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
97. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
98. See id. at 1246-47.
99. See id. at 1235.
100. See id. at 1243-44. New Jersey law requires that "where there has been no written surrender ...termination of parental rights will not be granted in this state absent a very strong
showing of abandonment or neglect." Id. at 1243.
101. See id. at 1245-46. Although she was not a party to the contract, the wife of the intended
father was to adopt the baby after birth. See id. at 1235.
102. See id. at 1240-41. The intended father agreed to pay the surrogate $10,000. See id. at
1235.
103. See id. at 1246-47.
104. See id. at 1247. The court found that this agreement's effect was to "give the father the
exclusive right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother." Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1246-48.
107. See id. at 1248-50; see also Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 765 (Ohio C.P. 1994).
While the Belsito court acknowledged the policy against private contracts to surrender parental
rights, it ruled against the gestational surrogate by holding that the intended parents have a ge-
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Courts considering gestational-type arrangements rather than a
traditional surrogate arrangement have demonstrated greater lenience.
For example, in Johnson v. Calvert,10 8 the parties entered into a
gestational surrogacy agreement whereby the intended parents
contributed their genetic material to be implanted in the surrogate. 10 9 In
reviewing the surrogate's action to be declared the child's mother, the
California Supreme Court found that the gestational contract did not
1 10
violate the public policy expressed in California adoption statutes.
Further, the Johnson court rejected the notion that gestational surrogate
agreements dehumanize women and, therefore, violate public policy.I'
The Johnson court's approval of the gestational arrangement reflects
the legal significance of both the genetic bond between the intended
parents and the child, as well as the parental intent to beget the child.' 1 2
Indeed, the Johnson court placed great emphasis on the intended
parents' desire to procreate and raise the child and, as such, awarded
parentage to the intended parents. 113
In another recent California case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca,114 the
intended parents entered into an agreement with the surrogate where
neither the intended parents nor the surrogate were genetically related to
the child." 5 Both the sperm and egg were contributed by anonymous
donors and, subsequent to the insemination, the intended parents
divorced. 116 After several proceedings at the trial and appellate level,
the California Appellate Court found that the intent of the couple at the
time of the agreement was sufficient to establish parentage."i 7 Relying
on the parties' intentions, rather than the biological relationship, the
California Court of Appeals determined that even in the absence of a
written surrogate agreement and where only an oral agreement is in

netic tie to child. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767.
108. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
109. See id. at 778.
110. See id. at 783-84.
111. See id. at 784-85.
112. See id. at 782-83; cf. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 765 (stating that the Johnson intent test conflicts with the surrender of parental rights by contract and the public policy behind adoption law
that calls for a pressure-free chance to surrender parental rights).
113. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (concluding that when genetic consanguinity and the actual
giving birth are done by two women, the one who intended to have and raise the child is the
mother).
114. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
115. Seeid.at282.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 293.
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place, parentage should be attributed to the intended parents, as they
made the necessary arrangements to beget the child." 8
B. ConstitutionalLaw
Undoubtedly, an Illinois court sorting through a surrogacy dispute
will encounter constitutional arguments. Although Illinois case law
considers individual constitutional rights, 119 generally no published

cases specifically delineate rights associated with surrogacy.
In defining the constitutional parameters of a surrogacy agreement,
courts outside of Illinois have applied various principles, including the
120
scope of the right to privacy and procreational autonomy,'

substantively recognized
in the Due Process Clause, as well as equal
1 21
protection concerns.
Protections afforded under the substantive due process doctrine are
found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. 122 Under the Substantive Due Process doctrine, the right
123
of privacy protects persons against unlawful government invasion.
While not expressly stated in the Constitution, the United States
124
Supreme Court has declared the right to privacy a fundamental right.

118. Seeid.at291.
119. See Helvey v. Rednour, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (Il. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1980). The Fifth District noted that "certain personal rights have been deemed fundamental to the concept of ordered
liberty and worthy of constitutional protection. Among these are the rights to marry, procreate,
use contraceptives, undergo abortion, engage in family relationships and rear and educate children." Id.
120. See Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438, 440-41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
right to bear children is a fundamental interest protected by the right of privacy); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the right to procreate is an integral part of a person's right to privacy).
121. See Soos v. Superior Court County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359-60 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (holding an Arizona statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV. In pertinent part, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment similarly states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Finally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
123. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the use of contraception).
124. See id. at 483, 486 (creating the right to privacy under the penumbra of rights that coincide with those in the Bill of Rights).
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This right affords protection in certain areas including prorelationships, 127 and child
creation,1 25 contraception, 126 family
128
rearing.
This right cannot
be abridged unless a powerful
129
countervailing interest exists.
In surrogate disputes, the parties will assert these rights toward the
ends that will best serve their interests. For instance, couples hoping to

enforce an agreement will assert that the fundamental right to privacy
protects their procreation choices and cannot be impinged upon by state
public policy. The surrogate, seeking to disavow the agreement, will
argue that she has a fundamental right to beget and enjoy the
companionship of the child.
A number of state courts have considered these rights. For instance,
in Doe v. Kelley, 130 a Michigan appellate court refused to extend the
131
right of privacy to surrogate arrangements that involve compensation.
In a brief opinion, the court refused to allow the parties to circumvent
Michigan adoption statutes. 132 Similarly, in In re Adoption of Paul,133 a
New York court found no constitutionally protected right to participate
in a compensable surrogate agreement that avoids relevant adoption

125. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Id. at 453.
126. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-498 (reversing the criminal convictions of a doctor and
executor of Planned Parenthood who gave advice regarding contraceptive use because the Connecticut statute barring contraception use constituted an undue invasion of the marital privacy
protected under the Bill of Rights).
127. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (stating that the family is unique to society and, therefore, the Constitution must be applied flexibly to meet the needs of a parent and
child).
128. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that a state cannot
arbitrarily enter into the privacy of family life).
129. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (recognizing that the
countervailing interest rule has become deeply entrenched in the law through prior United States
Supreme Court decisions).
130. Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (acknowledging that while a couple has a fundamental right to bear or beget a child, this right did not protect decisions to compensate the surrogate for her services).
131. Seeid.at441.
132. See id.
133. In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
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laws.' 34 The court found no right to participate in an arrangement that
135
allows for the sale of a child in violation of state law.
In another Michigan case, the Michigan Court of Appeals
acknowledged fundamental rights in matters of childbearing. 136 The
court noted, however, that compelling state interests existed to justify
137
Doe v. Attorney Genera1138
Michigan's regulation of surrogacy.
involved a challenge to Michigan's Surrogate Parenting Act, which
voided surrogate parenting agreements and criminalized paid surrogate
arrangements. 139 In upholding the act, the court found that the interests
expressed in the act were sufficiently "compelling" to justify infringing
on the right to privacy. 14° Specifically, the court found sufficiently
compelling interests existed in: (1) keeping children from becoming
commodities; (2) addressing the best interests of the child; and (3)
stopping the exploitation of women. 141
In In re Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the right
of procreation in the context of surrogacy.142 The court noted that the
right of procreation did not necessarily entitle a biological father and his
wife, the intended non-genetic mother, to the custody of a child born
pursuant to a surrogate agreement. 14 3 Further, the court held the
mother's right to companionship with her child is a constitutionally
protected interest. 144 The court, however, declined to decide whether
1 45
the surrogate arrangement would cause a deprivation of this right.
Rather, the court invalidated the agreement and conducted a "best
interests" analysis. 146 The court found that the best interests of the child

134. See id. at 818. In Paul, the parties agreed that in exchange for $10,000, the surrogate
would be inseminated with the intended father's sperm and that after birth, the surrogate would
relinquish parentage to the intended father and his wife. See id. at 815. Upon review, the court
voided the agreement, holding that the right to bear or beget a child does not extend to violating
state adoption laws that prohibit compensation. See id. at 818.
135. See id. at 818.
136. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that both
federal and state constitutions provide protection from governmental intrusion in childbearing
decisions).
137. See id. at 486-87.
138. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
139. See id. at 489.
140. See id. at 487.
141. See id. at 486-87.
142. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-54 (N.J. 1988).

143. See id at 1254.
144. See id. at 1255.
145.

See id.

146. See id.at 1255-56.
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justified awarding custody to the father and his wife and allowing the

mother visitation. 147
In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court addressed a
variety of constitutional concerns with respect to a gestational surrogate
agreement. 14 8 First, the Johnson court noted that the gestational
surrogate has no equal protection claim over the loss of custody. 149 In
determining that the surrogate was not the legal mother, the Johnson
court also rejected the gestational surrogate's claim to a right of
companionship with the child.150 Lastly, the Johnson court rejected the
surrogate's claim to a right of privacy on procreational matters under
51
California's Constitution. 1
As exemplified in Johnson, courts also consider equal protection
arguments in determining surrogacy disputes. The Equal Protection
Clause appears in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois
Constitution.1 52 Under an equal protection argument, one side asserts
that a suspect classification, such as race, gender, age, or national
origin, is receiving disparate treatment under the law in a similar
circumstance.
In the context of reproductive rights, one state court voided its statute
banning surrogacy on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In Soos v. Superior Court County of Maricopa,153 the Arizona
Court of Appeals found that the prohibitive statute treated similarly
situated men and woman differently. 54 Specifically, the court noted
that the statute permitted men who were not the husband of the
delivering mother to rebut the presumption of paternity. 155 In contrast,

147. See id. at 1258-59.
148. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785-87 (Cal. 1993).
149. See id. at 785. The Johnson court stated, "a woman who voluntarily agrees to gestate
and deliver for a married couple a child who is their genetic offspring is situated differently from
the wife who provides the ovum for fertilization, intending to mother the resulting child." Id. at
785.
150. See id. at 786 (reasoning that although the surrogate was the birth mother, her companionship rights were not the traditional type because she agreed to gestate and deliver a child for
someone else).
151. See id. at 786-87. "A woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy arrangement is not
exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is agreeing to provide a necessary and
profoundly important service without (by definition) any expectation that she will raise the resulting child as her own." Id. at 787.
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST., art. I., § 2.
153. Soos v. Superior Court County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
154. See id. at 1361.
155. See id. at 1360.
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however, the statute allowed women who contributed their genetic
materials to the child to establish a maternal link. 156 The Arizona court
applied a strict scrutiny standard, according to which only a
countervailing compelling interest can justify the abridgment of the
fundamental right to decisions in matters of childbearing. The court
found no such compelling interest and, consequently, found the statute
57
to be void. 1
C.

Family Law

At its core, surrogacy disputes focus on placement of the child. In
making a decision, many courts refuse to consider the intentions of the
parties (i.e., as apparent in a surrogacy agreement). Instead, they
consider the "best interests" of the child. In this approach, some of the
considerations include the wishes of the child, the wishes of the parents,
interactions with parents and siblings, adjustment to home, school, and
community, and the mental and physical health of those individuals

involved. 158
In Illinois, the "best interests" of the child is a primary, if not
dispositive standard. Most likely, courts would consider the "best
interests" of the child to resolve surrogacy custody disputes. The
emphasis on "best interests" is found in the Illinois Marriage and
16°
Dissolution of Marriage Act 159 as well as the Illinois Adoption Act.
Courts outside of Illinois considering surrogate disputes have also
employed the "best interests" analysis in varying manners. In Belsito v.
Clark,161 where the parties entered into a gestational surrogate
agreement, the Ohio court rejected an analysis that allowed the parties'
contractual intent to control. 162 Rather, the Belsito court emphasized the
"best interests" of the child. 163 In awarding parentage to the intended
parents, the court found the child's best interest required parentage to be

156. See id.
157. See id. at 1361 (holding that a mother's rights were impinged because while a biological
father could prove paternity, a mother could not and therefore was dissimilarly treated without
any reasonable justification).

158. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/602 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (providing "best interests"
factors for custody determinations).
159. Id.
160. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/20a (West 1998) (holding the "best interests and welfare" to
be the paramount consideration in interpreting the Adoption Act).
161. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994).

162. See id. at 766.
163.

See id.
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awarded to the party with the strongest genetic link, the intended
parents. 164
Similarly, in In re Baby M, after invalidating the parties' traditional
surrogacy agreement, the New Jersey Supreme Court resorted to a "best
interests" determination. 165 The court ruled in favor of the biological
father after considering all of the factors including the surrogate's
66
misconduct throughout the legal proceedings. 1
In Baby M, the court based its "best interest" analysis on all the
circumstances related to the child's best interest. 167 In doing so, it
focused on the favorable circumstances involving the child's father and
his wife as well as the unfavorable circumstances surrounding
placement with the surrogate and her husband. 168 With respect to the
father, the court noted his stable family life, secure financial situation,
happy marriage, and supportive friends. 169 With respect to the
surrogate, the court looked at the unstable family situation and
troublesome financial situation. 170 Also, the court considered the
surrogate's actions during the legal proceeding, including her flight to
Florida with the child in violation of an earlier court order, her
telephone threats to kill "Baby M," her threats to accuse the father of
17 1
sexual abuse, and her threat to kill herself.
IV.

LEGISLATION

As noted earlier, in passing P.A. 91-308, the Illinois General
Assembly has given hopeful parents some direction by exempting them
from the adoption process. 172 Even with the recent enactment of P.A.
91-308, however, many gaps still exist with respect to surrogacy
arrangements. In crafting a comprehensive policy, it is useful to review
existing statutes in other states.

164. See id. at 767. "For the best interest of the child and society, there are strong arguments
to recognize the genetic parents as the natural parents. The genetic parent can guide the child
from experience through the strengths and weaknesses of a common ancestry of genetic traits."
Id. at 766.
165. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246 (N.J. 1988).

166. See id. at 1261.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1258-59.

169. See id. at 1259.
170. See id. at 1258.
171. See id. at 1257-58.
172.

See supra Part Il.A (discussing P.A. 91-308).
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National Legislation

Several states, including Arkansas, Florida, and Nevada, have
In addition to expressly
enacted pro-surrogate legislation. 173
sanctioning variations of surrogacy, these states have taken measures to
allay some of the legal complications connected with the process. 174 In
Arkansas, for example, when the intended mother is biologically
unrelated to the child, it is not necessary to conduct a stepparent
adoption.' 75 Also, the marital status of the biological father and/or the
intended mother is typically irrelevant in determining a presumption of
parenthood.

176

Nevada law defers to the agreement of the parties and sanctions a
gestational surrogate arrangement.1 77 Compensation for the surrogate's
services, however, is prohibited. 178 Under Nevada law, the intended
' 79
parent is to be treated as the natural parent "under all circumstances."'
Florida's legislative scheme distinguishes between traditional
surrogacy' 80 and gestational surrogacy. 181 Gestational agreements are
In contrast, traditional surrogate
binding and enforceable. 182

173. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212,
742.14 to 15 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (Lexis 1998). In addition,
some states, such as New Hampshire and Virginia, have enacted comprehensive surrogate legislation. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 to 32 (1994 & Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20156 to 165 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999).
174. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212, 742.14 to 15; NEV. REV.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 to 32; STAT. § 126.045; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 165.
175. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(1), (c)(1)(A) (stating that in the case of a surrogate,
the biological father and the intended mother will be the parents of the child).
176. See id. § 9-10-201(b), (c)(l) (stating that in the case of a surrogate arrangement, the child
shall belong solely to the biological father if he is unmarried and the child shall belong to the intended mother when artificial insemination occurred with an anonymous sperm donor).
177. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (stating that a married couple "may enter into a contract
with a surrogate for.., a pregnancy resulting when an egg and sperm from the intended parents
are placed in" the surrogate).
178. See id. § 126.045(3). Nevada, however, allows for reimbursement of medical and necessary living expenses. See id.
179. See id. § 126.045(2) (concluding that "an intended parent in a contract" with a surrogate
"must be treated in law as a natural parent under all circumstances").
180. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (defining "intended mother"
as a female who "intends to have the parental rights and responsibilities for a child conceived
through a fertility technique, regardless of whether the child is biologically related to the female").
181. See id. § 742.13 (defining "gestational surrogate" as "a woman who contracts to become
pregnant by means of assisted reproductive technology without the use of an egg from her
body").
182. See id. § 742.15(1) (requiring a binding contract to be made between the intended parents
and the gestational surrogate prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy).
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arrangements may be terminated at any time.18 3 For traditional
184
arrangements, however, Florida allows for "preplanned adoptions."'
Interestingly, Florida's statutes on both traditional and gestational
surrogacy require the intended parents to accept custody and assume
full parental responsibility notwithstanding any impairment to the
185
child.
Although some states have not articulated a comprehensive scheme,
they are receptive to surrogacy to the extent that such arrangements are
exempt from prohibitive "baby-selling" statutes. 186 While many states
allow the payment of reasonable expenses, 187 the expenses that are
considered "reasonable" vary greatly. 188 Lastly, a few states have
created a statutory presumption favoring the intended parents as the
legal parents, unless the expecting or delivering mother changes her
89
mind within a stated period of time. 1
Other states with comprehensive schemes have additional noteworthy
provisions. 19° For instance, Florida requires the mother to adhere to
reasonable medical instructions,' 9 1 while New Hampshire allows the
surrogate to voluntarily terminate the pregnancy. 192 In several
instances, the parties to the agreement must submit to various suitability

183. See id. § 63.212(1)(i)(2)(i) (stating that the preplanned adoption agreement must provide
"[tihat the agreement may be terminated at any time by any of the parties").
184. See id. § 63.212(1)(i). Essentially, pre-planned adoption agreements are surrogacy arrangements that are subject to regulation and are voidable. See id.
185. See id. §§ 63.212(1)(i)(2)(g), 742.15(3)(d).
186. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-34 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-4-16(e)(3) (Lexis 1999).
187. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(l)(i)(2)(f); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 722.853(a)
(West 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045(3) (Lexis 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(V)
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-160(B)(5), 20-162(B)(3) (Michie 1995); WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.26.210(1), 26.26.240 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16(e)(3); see also 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 525/4.1 (West 1998). The Illinois Adoption Compensation Prohibition Act allows recovery for some expenses in connection with the planned adoption of a child to be born. See 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 525/4.1.
188. For example, in Virginia, a surrogate is only entitled to reasonable medical expenses and
ancillary costs. See VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-160(b)(5), 20-162(B)(3); see also id. § 20-156 (defining "reasonable medical and ancillary costs"). In New Hampshire, in addition to medical expenses, attorney fees, and court costs, the surrogate may receive actual lost wages, counseling
costs, and payments for health, disability, and life insurance. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168B:25(V).
189. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 63.212(2)(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:23(IV), 168B:25(IV); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-158(D), 20-161(B).
190. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212, 742.15; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 to 32; VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 165.
191. See FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 63.212(l)(i)(2)(b), 742.15(3)(b).
192. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:27.
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tests. 193 Lastly, some jurisdictions require the intended mother to
represent that she is unable to bear a child. 194

In contrast, several states are hostile toward certain aspects of
surrogacy. Many jurisdictions will not enforce paid surrogate
agreements. 195 Terms such as "paid," "compensation," and "expenses,"
vary depending on the jurisdiction, and there is much variety in which
payments are prohibited. 196 Several jurisdictions void both paid and
unpaid surrogate agreements. 197 A handful of states expressly prohibit
98

compensation for an intermediary setting up a surrogate arrangement. 1
B. An Illinois Approach

Consistent with the national trend, the Illinois General Assembly has
expressed a policy allowing gestational surrogate arrangements. '99 The
recent enactment favors a genetic tie over a maternal tie in certain
200
instances.

Basing family rights on genetic kinship is logical for several reasons.
Most prominent is that genetic kinship offers a unique and profound
relationship. Such a relationship always endures even when the family
unit is modified in instances of death, divorce, or remarriage.
Knowledge of lineage is important to the child's identity, continuity,
and security. Also, knowledge of blood lineage is important in
addressing health issues and family medical tendencies. Lastly, a
genetic-based preference favors and honors reproductive decisions by

193. See id. at §§ 168-B:18, B:19; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-160(B)(7), (11).
194. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2)(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17; VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(B)(8).
195. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Lexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-16(B)(4); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West 1997). Further, the Florida statute declares certain compensation
for a traditional surrogacy arrangement to be void. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i)(2)(f).
196. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the various definitions of reasonable expenses among jurisdictions).
197. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401 to 402 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to 3
(West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.855, 722.859 (West 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 121-123 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-204(1)-(2) (1999).
198. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i)(5); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.590(4); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 722.859; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168B:16(IV); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(b) (1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-165; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26-26.230.
199. See Act of July 29, 1999, Pub. Act. No. 91-308, sec. 6, § 45/6, 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv.
2891, 2891-92 (West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6).
200. See id.
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the parties, such as the intended parents' decision to beget the child and

the surrogate's decision to bear the child.
In discussing gestational arrangements, courts not only recognize the
significant bond that exists between the genetic parents and the child,
but also the minimal bond between the surrogate and the child.2 °1 One
20 2
court has determined that the surrogate's role is limited to gestation.
The court further concluded that the gestational
surrogate normally does
20 3

not contribute any genetic material to the fetus.
In contrast, similar arguments cannot be made with a traditional

surrogate arrangement because the surrogate has a profound genetic tie
to the child. The child is created using the egg of the surrogate. Thus,

this distinction presents a sensible line of demarcation in designing
surrogate policy.
Based on this distinction, the legislature should fashion a broad,
reliable framework that affords protection to couples pursuing a

gestational arrangement. In addition to the recently enacted adoption
"by-pass" statute, the legislature should structure the contractual
relationship between the parties. As for traditional surrogacy, the
legislature should treat this arrangement as a "preplanned adoption" and

limit the parties' relationship in a manner similar to Florida's model. 2 4
1. Gestational Arrangements
With respect to gestational arrangements, several improvements
could be made to Illinois' existing legislation. The statutes should be
broadened to permit the use of anonymously donated eggs or sperm.
201. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761-62, 766 (Ohio C.P. 1994). The Belsito court
noted:
[t]here is abundant precedent for using the genetics test for identifying a natural parent.
For the best interest of the child and society, there are strong arguments to recognize
the genetic parent as the natural parent. The genetic parent can guide the child from
experience through the strengths and weaknesses of a common ancestry of genetic
traits. Because that test has served so well, it should remain the primary test for determining the natural parent, or parents, in nongenetic-providing surrogacy cases.
Id. at 766.
202. See id. at 761-62. In Belsito, the court noted:
[t]he fetus placed in the carrier sets up an entirely separate system from the carrier.
The uterus provides only a means of nourishment to and a means of carrying waste
away from the baby's system. The uterus provides a "filtering system" for the child.
Blood between the carrier and the fetus is not exchanged during the pregnancy, absent
some complication. According to [a physician], there would be no genetic or blood tie
to the surrogate host.
Id.
203. See id.
204. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
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This would enlarge the alternatives for infertile couples, allow the
couple to maintain a genetic tie to the child, and maintain the
surrogate's minimal bond with the child. In addition, these proceedings
should be closed to the public.
Assuming that the parties enter into a gestational agreement, certain
stipulations and limitations should be incorporated. The following
terms should be integrated into the agreement: (1) the intended parents
agree that the gestational surrogate will have the sole power of consent
regarding clinical intervention and management of the pregnancy; (2)
the gestational surrogate agrees to submit to reasonable medical
evaluation and to comply with reasonable medical instructions; (3) the
gestational surrogate agrees to forfeit all parental rights upon the child's
birth and will cooperate with any necessary judicial proceedings; and
(4) the intended parents agree to accept custody and assume full
parental rights and responsibilities regardless of any impairment to the
child. 20 5 The parties should be over the age of eighteen to assure
competency to contract. Further, expenses paid by the intended parents
to a gestational surrogate should be limited to reasonable living, legal,
medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses related to the prenatal,
intrapartal, and postpartal periods. Lastly, the court should be given
authority to invalidate the agreement if it is not in the best interests of
the child.
2. Traditional Surrogacy
As for traditional surrogacy, Illinois should consider legislation based
on the Florida model. 2° Under Florida law, a "preplanned adoption"
arrangement must be clearly identified as such and be approved by the
court.2° 7 The preplanned arrangement needs to be based upon an
agreement. 20 8 The agreement should include the following terms: (1) an
agreement by the "volunteer mother" or surrogate to become pregnant,
to bear the child, and to terminate any parental rights subject to the
seven-day right of rescission after birth of the child; (2) an agreement
by the surrogate to submit to reasonable medical evaluation and
treatment and comply with reasonable medical instructions; (3) an
agreement by the surrogate to assume parental rights and
responsibilities for the child if the intended parents terminate the

205. These recommendations are largely based on Florida's gestational surrogate statute. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3).
206. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 63.212.
207. See id. § 63.212(1)(i).
208. See id.
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agreement before final transfer of custody or if the agreement is not
approved by the court; (4) where the intended father is also the
biological father, an agreement by the father to assume parental rights
and responsibilities if the agreement is terminated by any party; (5) an
understanding by the intended parents that they will not receive
parentage if the agreement is terminated prior to transfer of custody or if
the surrogate rescinds during the seven-day period; (6) an agreement by
the intended parents to accept custody and assume parentage upon birth
regardless of any impairment to the child; and (7) an agreement by all
parties that the agreement may be terminated at any time. 20 9 Further,
under the Florida model, a preplanned adoption agreement cannot
contain any provision that reduces payment to the surrogate if the child
is stillborn or impaired, or that requires termination of the surrogate's
pregnancy. 210 Florida's statute on preplanned adoptions provides a
thoughtful legislative model for traditional surrogacy, by forcing parties
to confront potential problems before they arise.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Illinois General Assembly has spoken on the surrogacy
issue, gaps in policy still remain. Most likely, the controversial and
complex nature of this issue has prevented the General Assembly from
enunciating a comprehensive workable policy.
Notwithstanding the lack of direction in some areas, technology
continues to advance. Within the last several years, the "future" has1
21
become the present with advancements in cloning,
cryopreservation, 2 12 artificial insemination,2 13 and genetic engineering.
In addition, clinics are making this technology available on a

209. See id. § 63.212(1)(i)(2).
210. See id. § 63.212(l)(i)(3).
211. "Dolly the Sheep" is but one example of recent advances in cloning. See Steve Kloehn &
Paul Salopek, Humanity Still at Heart, Soul of Cloning Issue: Scientists and Theologians Agree
We Are Our Own Persons, CHI. TRIB., March 2, 1997, § 1, at 1.
212. The freezing and storing of eggs and embryos, or cryopreservation, allows for assisted
conception to take place over a period of time. This improves the chances for conception by allowing physicians to implant embryos and eggs at a physiologically optimal time. See GEOFFREY
SHER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE A.R.T. OF MAKING BABIES 170-71 (1998).
213. Several in vitro techniques have improved the odds of those seeking to conceive. GIFT,
(gamete intrafallopian transfer) for example, is a gamete-related technique that consists of injection of one or more eggs mixed with treated sperm directly into the fallopian tube(s) in the hope
that fertilization will occur in vitro and that a healthy pregnancy will follow. Similar to GIFT is
ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian transfer). ZIF involves the placement of one or more zygotes into
the outer third of the fallopian tube(s) in the hope that the resulting embryo will travel to the
uterus and be successfully implanted. See id. at 150-53, 202, 215.
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widespread basis 2 14 and individuals continue to pursue these
215
arrangements.
Inevitably, these disputes will be brought to the courts and will
present questions of first impression. Regardless of what one thinks of
the advancing reproductive technologies, science will continue to
advance. Given the predictable future litigation, it is essential that the
General Assembly carefully evaluate the issues and promulgate a
comprehensive legislative policy. With a definitive policy in place,
Illinois courts could be spared the cumbersome burden of crafting
surrogate policy one decision at a time.

214. Presently, more than 320 clinics throughout the country offer in vitro services. See id. at
xiii (providing statistics as to the growth of in vitro fertilization programs since the first successful test tube birth in 1978).
215. One of the more unusual examples occurred in late 1993, when an aspiring surrogate
mother used a billboard facing a busy Houston highway to announce her "Womb for Rent." See
Hundreds Call About "Wombfor Rent" Ad, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1993, § 1, at 18.

